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Our 1986 paper ‘Private Provision of Public Goods’ presents a theorem on 
the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods. 
Richard Hirth of the University of Pennsylvania and Clive Fraser of 
Warwick have independently suggested that although our theorem is correct, 
our proof is incorrect. Each writer proposes an alternative method of proof 
for the theorem. With characteristic charity to our own deficiencies, we prefer 
to view our earlier proof as unduly opaque rather than wrong. Whichever 
view one takes, a more transparent proof is called for. The proof presented 
here follows the same outline as our 1986 proof, but explains a step of the 
argument that was far from obvious in the original proof. This proof uses the 
notation of the 1986 paper, and refers to ‘Facts’ that are proved there. 
Theorem 3. There is a unique Nash equilibrium, with a uniquely determined 
quantity of public good and set of contributing consumers. 
Suppose that there are two Nash equilibria, with public goods quantities G 
and G’, and corresponding sets of contributors C and C’. Without loss of 
generality, let G’SG. Since G’ is a Nash equilibrium, according to Fact 1, it 
must be that G’ 2Jdwi + G’_J for all consumers i (whether or not they belong 
to C’). In particular, this inequality applies to every consumer in C. 
Therefore w~+G’,~S~~(G’) for all i4. Summing these inequalities and 
rearranging terms we have 
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But CiecgigCisc,gi= G’. Therefore 
According to Fact 2, &sC Wi = F( G, C). Therefore F( G, C) s F(G’, C). Since 
F is monotone increasing in G, it follows that G’BG. Therefore G’=G. The 
set of contributors is uniquely determined by G, so that it must also be that 
C=C’. 0 
